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A REVIEW OF SOME NORMATIVE 
AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
Mark MacCarthy* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Controversy has surrounded public policy toward occupational 
safety and health at least since the establishment of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in 1971.1 Political, legal, 
and economic conflicts have surfaced in debates over the existence 
and nature of rights to safety' and health on the job, the use of 
economic criteria in setting safety and health standards, and the 
principles that are to guide public policy in this area. 2 Many of these 
issues were raised in recent court cases. In Industrial Union Depart-
ment, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute3 (the benzene case), 
the Supreme Court decided that OSHA must make a threshold deter-
mination of significant risk before lowering the permissible exposure 
level of a toxic substance. In American Textile Manufacturers Insti-
• Mark MacCarthy, Ph,D, (Philosophy) Indiana University 1975, M.A, (Economics) Universi-
ty of Notre Dame 1978, formerly economist with the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration, is a professional staff member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, This 
article was written with the support of the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy at the 
University of Maryland, Cynthia Bascetta, Douglas MacLean, and Henry Shue provided 
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, Special thanks are due to Mark Sagoff for 
crucial insights into these issues and for his indefatigable efforts to render this article a more 
coherent, readable whole, 
L The agency was established by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. 
No, 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590, codified at 29 U,S.C, §§ 651-678 (1976), and is part of the Depart-
ment of Labor. 
2, For two introductions to these debates, from opposite points of view, see N, ASHFORD, 
CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE: OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND INJURY (1976); and R.S, SMITH, THE 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT (1976). 
3. Industrial Union Dept., A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. Amer. Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980). 
See text at notes 79-83 infra. 
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tute, Inc. v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor4 (the cotton dust case), the 
Supreme Court upheld OSHA's policy of setting exposure levels for 
toxic substances at the lowest feasible level. In February 1981, the 
Reagan Administration issued an Executive Order addressing these 
problems.5 It sets the maximization of net benefits to society as the 
goal for all regulatory agencies and bars any major regulatory action 
unless its potential benefits to society outweigh its potential costs. 
Controversy continues over the appropriateness of this cost-benefit 
approach to occupational safety and health. 6 
Although legal, political, and economic perspectives dominate 
these debates, the best means of improving the quality of public 
policy decisions concerning occupational safety and health is by 
clearly understanding the philosophical issues involved. This article 
identifies and describes the major issues of occupational safety and 
health that are in need of and amenable to philosophical clarification. 
It begins with a discussion of the nature of occupational risk that em-
phasizes the crucial distinction between individual health risks and 
group outcomes, draws attention to some features of occupational 
health risks that separate them from other threats to health, and 
notes the unequal distribution of these risks. In the next section, the 
discussion turns to the ethical basis for public control of occupational 
risk. Collective action to reduce health threats in the workplace is re-
quired to protect workers' rights, to ensure a more equitable 
distribution of occupational risks, and to implement the shared 
public values that lie behind the concern for workplace safety. The 
following section discusses the appropriate criteria for setting public 
policy on occupational safety and health. The economic techniques of 
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis are examined, and the 
argument is made that these analytic techniques neglect normative 
considerations and can incorporate them only in inappropriate and 
misleading ways. Further, the use of cost-benefit and cost-effec-
tiveness analysis as the sole or principal rules for policy in this area 
would tend to undermine the convictions that motivate public con-
cern about the issue of occupational safety and health. The final sec-
tion surveys alternative public policy principles, including cost con-
tainment approaches, risk-averse strategies, and the current official 
OSHA policy of feasibility analysis. The incompleteness of these ap-
proaches suggests the need for the development of a decision 
4. Amer. Textile Manufacturers Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981). See text at 
notes 84-89 infra. 
5. Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). 
6. Kelman, Cost-Be'Mjit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 REGULATION 33-40 (1981). 
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framework that would more adequately integrate health and eco-
nomic information while allowing concerns over workers' rights, dis-
tributive justice, and public values to influence public policy material-
ly. 
II. THE NATURE OF OCCUPATIONAL RISK 
Before addressing the major philosophical questions, several 
preliminary remarks may help to identify the special nature of the 
occupational safety and health problem. First, individual risks must 
be distinguished from group outcomes.7 Risk, in general, is the prob-
ability of an adverse outcome. Occupational risk is the probability of 
an injury or illness due to hazards in the workplace. These hazards, 
such as noise, toxic substances, or unguarded machinery, often pro-
duce a regular, predictable number of injuries and illnesses in the ex-
posed worker population. At the individual level, the outcome is 
hypothetical; an individual worker mayor may not be killed, injured, 
or made ill by workplace hazards. At this level, workers take their 
chances. In many situations, however, the outcome at the group level 
can be accurately predicted, and one may, then, expect a certain 
number of illnesses and injuries to appear in the exposed worker 
population as a whole. At this level, chance gives way to certainty. 
A. The Individual and the Group 
This distinction between the risk each individual takes and the 
overall outcome for the group is a conceptual distinction, related to 
the difference between statements about individuals and statements 
about the groups to which individuals belong. This distinction raises 
two questions regarding many kinds of risks. Consider, for example, 
coffee, which is allegedly involved in cancer of the pancreas.8 If cof-
fee is involved in producing half of all pancreatic cancers, a noncof-
fee drinker aged fifty to fifty-four has· seven chances in one hundred 
thousand of developing cancer of the pancreas in any single year. A 
coffee drinker's chances are doubled or tripled to approximately 
fourteen to twenty-one out of one hundred thousand. Should a per-
son, then, avoid this extra risk by not drinking coffee? A different 
question arises with respect to the population as a whole. If coffee is 
7. For a discussion of this distinction see Oi, On the Economics of Industrial Safety, 38 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROB. 670 (1974). 
8. Cohn, Harvard Scientists Find Link to Pancreatic Cancer, Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1981, at 
A-I, col. 1, A-9, col. 9. See also MacMahon, Coffee and Cancer of the Pancreas, 304 THE NEW 
ENG. J. OF MED. 630 (1981). 
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implicated in producing half of all pancreatic cancers, then the con-
sumption of coffee in the United States produces about twelve thou-
sand of those cancers annually. Should steps be taken to reduce this 
number? 
In the first example, we focus on the decision of the individual 
agent. His or her choice is essentially a private one. In the second 
case, we are concerned with the balance between two collective 
goals: the protection of public health and the provision of other social 
goods, including individual freedom of choice. This is a paradigm 
problem in public decision making. 
This example illustrates the logical difference between the ques-
tion, "Is this risk too great for me?" and the question, "Does the 
social value of this risky activity balance the certain harm that can be 
expected to result from it?" An answer to the first question is not 
necessarily an answer to the second. The distinction between ques-
tions concerning individual risk and questions concerning group out-
comes (and group responsibility for these outcomes) parallels the dif-
ference between private and public choice. 
In the area of occupational safety and health, the distinction be-
tween individual risk and group outcome is reflected in the dif-
ference between two approaches to public health. Economists typ-
ically take an individualistic approach. They are concerned with the 
rational choices individuals might make when confronted with a 
probability or an uncertainty about some harm.9 The other approach, 
more typical of doctors and other public health professionals, con-
cerns predictable group outcomes and whether they are acceptable. 
The difference in focus is related to a difference in public policy 
goals: in the one instance, the problem is that the probability of an 
actual outcome is too large for the individual to accept; in the other, 
the aggregate outcome is too severe for society to tolerate. 
It is fair to suggest that the label "risk" encourages, even if it does 
not strictly imply, an individualistic self-regarding (as distinct from 
group-regarding) approach to occupational safety. That may seem 
appropriate. Individuals face risks; it is they who bear them. The 
most familiar context in which people evaluate risks is personal-are 
the chances of being killed in an automobile or airplane accident too 
great for me? Will cigarettes give me cancer? Is this job too risky for 
9. T.C. Shelling expresses the individualist view forcefully when he asserts that in-
vestments in safety and health buy "a reduction in individual risks. The lives saved are usually 
a mathematical construct." Shelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN 
PUBLIC POLICY EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 161 (S. Chase ed. 1968). 
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me? Will coffee ruin my pancreas? These are familiar questions 
which we, as individuals, ask ourselves. 
Yet there are other questions concerning risk which we may ask 
ourselves not as self-regarding individuals but as members of a soci-
ety. We may wonder, for example, whether the yearly toll of automo-
bile deaths is socially acceptable. Are risks imposed by various prod-
ucts-cigarettes and coffee among them-of the sort that should be 
left to individual discretion? The problem of workplace safety, at 
least as much as the problem of highway safety or product safety, 
has a public dimension. 
The sheer amount of injury or death may be an appropriate cause 
of public as well as individual concern. From the individual point of 
view, a probability of death or injury, say one in a thousand, remains 
the same whether ten or ten million people take the same risk. From 
the social point of view, however, the difference is important: it could 
mean the loss of a thousand lives. How should we respond as a nation 
to these numbers? When occupational safety and health information 
is presented in terms of individual probabilities only, an evaluation 
typically follows in terms of the individual, not the group. By describ-
ing the problem this way-in terms of individual risks rather than 
community costs-we may commit ourselves to a subtle but powerful 
bias toward individualistic rather than community norms and values. 
B. Hazards to Health 
Occupational hazards are threats to health. These threats are 
special in that what may be lost-life or functional capacity-is ir-
replaceable. In the case of loss of life or limb, the irreplaceability is 
obvious. But the functional impairment oflungs or ears caused by ex-
posure to hazards is also often irreversible, and the impairment be-
comes permanent. Techniques to reverse these effects are some-
times available, but in many instances, for example, chelation 
therapy for lead poisoning, the cure can be worse than the disease. 
In addition, people cannot always be compensated for a loss of 
health. Damage to one's health is not altogether like damage to one's 
automobile. The insurance received for a damaged car, in principle at 
least, restores the owner to the earlier level of well-being. Compen-
sation, in short, can be paid in full. In occupational fatalities, 
however, the precondition for any compensation is precisely what is 
lost. Any payment that could feasibly be made to workers with per-
manent disabilities, moreover, would not be compensatory in the 
technical sense that the workers would just as soon have the compen-
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sation payment as their ability to walk or breathe. Normally, spend-
ing money, or what money can buy someone with diminished 
capacities, on disabling injuries and illnesses may be better than not 
doing so, but prevention may be better still.10 
Health is a precondition for a wide variety of other activities; it is 
an instrumental good. In fact, health is a precondition for such a 
wide variety of other activities that it is best viewed not simply as a 
value in itself, but as a condition of many or most other values. As 
such, it is not only an individual good, but also an element of social in-
frastructure, that is, an item that is needed to make possible the 
basic social and economic activities we engage in. From this point of 
view, maintaining an adequate public health system is in the same 
category as providing an adequate transportation system: wide-
spread defects in either would have serious consequences for almost 
everything else we do. In contrast, other commodities have a much 
smaller range of activities that depend on them. If bicycles, three-
piece suits, and garbage cans are not available, then certain desirable 
and socially worthwhile activities are foreclosed. But the range of 
such activities is small compared to the range of activities that de-
pend upon public health or an adequate transportation system. 
Health and physical integrity are also intrinsically valuable. They 
are social requirements not only in the sense that they are needed for 
other activities, but in the sense that they are desirable in and of 
themselves. They are primary goods in that they are things that all 
rational people want regardless of whatever else they want. 11 This 
does not imply that risk minimization is a primary good, for this en-
tails that people who risk their lives for good reason, for example, to 
conquer Mt. Everest or to free others from oppression, are irra-
tional. Rather, the idea is that what is being risked-health-is a 
primary good that even risk takers would prefer not to lose. 
C. Risk in the Workplace 
The conditions under which risks occur in the workplace differ 
from those associated with other activities, for example, participa-
tion in recreational sports. People sometimes seek or actively court 
danger. The danger itself is sometimes satisfying because, among 
10. For a discussion of the role of compensation in the occupational context see J. CHELIUS, 
WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH: THE ROLE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION (1977). Most discus-
sions grant the impossibility of compensation for permanent disabilities and death. See Oi, 
supra note 7, at 670. 
11. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 92-95 (1971) for a discussion of primary goods. 
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other things, it provides an opportunity for people to test them-
selves. Hence, dangerous sports like hang gliding are popular. In this 
sport-as in other risks people seek-the participants feel that their 
responses are crucial and they are engaged by and prove themselves 
against challenging conditions. 
Risks encountered on the job are typically quite different. First, 
while it is possible that police officers, fire fighters, and other 
workers sometimes seek and take satisfaction in the dangers they 
face, this is not true of most workers. Those put at risk by toxic 
chemicals, for example, hardly feel challenged by the hazards they 
confront.12 These risks do not call upon workers to show special 
strength or dexterity. They may feel as if they were sitting ducks in-
stead. In general, workers would like to avoid or minimize occupa-
tional hazards they face. 13 
Secondly, risks on the job typically have no natural consequences 
that are desired. Coffee and cigarettes produce feelings of well be-
ing. Hence, despite the risks involved, people are willing to spend 
large amounts of money to consume these items. Occupational risks 
are quite different in that, by and large, they have only undesirable 
natural consequences. Natural consequences of occupational risk 
that are genuinely relished are hard to locate, and certainly are not 
sufficient in themselves to outweigh these risks in the minds of those 
who must bear them. For this reason, workers, perhaps like financial 
investors, would have to be compensated in some way to be persuad-
ed to take risks. 
A third distinction can be made between risks encountered on and 
off the job. Many risks, from children's games to casino gambling, 
have a social meaning. When risk taking has trappings of moral im-
port, what is at stake is less important than the fact that undergoing 
the risk helps to structure social life. Esteem, honor, dignity, 
respect, and status all flow from withstanding symbolic gambles. 14 
12. For a sense of the anguish caused by exposure to toxic substances in the workplace see 
the account of the asbestos poisoning of chemical workers in P. BRODEUR, EXPENDABLE AMERI· 
CANS (1973). 
13. This is explicitly acknowledged in the standard economics literature where occupational 
risk is viewed as an undesirable job characteristic similar to hectic workpace, long workdays, 
and poor advancement opportunity. For a theoretical discussion see Thaler & Rosen, The 
Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND CON· 
SUMPTION 268-86 (N. Terleckyj ed. 1975). For a description of grass-roots concern over occupa-
tional safety issues see Howard, Do-It-Yourself Safety, 5 IN THESE TIMES 12-13 (1981). 
14. This notion of "status gambling" is crucial to understanding the persistence of betting 
behavior that would be irrational if one considered only the monetary stakes. See the discus-
sion of this problem in Geertz, Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight, 101 DAEDALUS 1 
(1972). 
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In unusual occupations, such as airplane testing, occupational risks 
can become symbolically important in just this way.15 For most 
workplace risks, however, such "status gambling" may have less to 
do with heightening the meaningfulness of life and more to do with 
manipulation and self-deception. The transformation of occupational 
risks into symbolic risks can either be imposed deliberately on 
workers as a way of avoiding hazard control or can be spontaneously 
generated by workers themselves as a defense mechanism to cope 
with their powerlessness. What seems clear, however, is that typical 
occupational hazards are not deliberately sought and that, if they 
were suddenly removed or greatly reduced, the "status gambling" 
attitudes fostered by the hazards would either wither away or find 
another focus. 
Finally, exposure to occupational hazards is, by and large, involun-
tary. For most people in our society, work is unavoidable. If in-
dividual workers find themselves facing unacceptable occupational 
risks they cannot simply withdraw from the market. They must 
choose among available occupations-and so some must accept risky 
jobs. This does not mean that workers are coerced into taking risky 
jobs in the same way that draftees are. But external conditions fre-
quently limit options so severely that coercion is not needed. The 
labor market sometimes structures risks so that those who bear 
them are not the informed, mobile risk-bearers of economic theory. 
Adequate information is often lacking; the power to insist on less 
risk does not exist; and there is no possibility of mobility. These 
limitations on choice characterize occupational as opposed to recrea-
tional or aesthetic risks. 
D. The Distribution of Occupational Risk 
Those who gain from risky work are not always those who do it. 
When hazardous working conditions lead to lower production costs, 
consumer prices go down and profits of business firms go up. But 
workers may suffer as a result. The distribution of risks among 
various industries, moreover, is plainly unequal. Some occupations 
and industries are extremely dangerous, while others are compara-
tively safe.16 This unequal distribution of risk is made all the more 
15. For an account of risk taking among test-pilots see T. WOLFE, THE RIGHT STUFF (1979). 
16. The Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Department of Labor collects statistics on occupa-
tional injuries and illnesses and publishes them by industry in an annual report, OCCUPATIONAL 
INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE UNITED STATES BY INDUSTRY. The differences in injury rates 
across industries have been stable since the survey began in 1973. 
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problematic because the burden of occupational risk apparently falls 
hardest on the comparatively disadvantaged. 17 
Those who bear occupational risks, moreover, sometimes form 
small specific groups-vinyl chloride workers and native American 
uranium miners are examples. Others form large, but identifiable, 
social groups, as is the case with cotton textile workers, coal miners, 
and steelworkers. These workers tend to share common attitudes 
and interests that make them recognizable as a group. They are like-
ly to regard occupational risk reduction as a matter of group in-
terest. 18 Risks associated with riding in automobiles or consuming 
saccharin-sweetened drinks or breathing polluted air, on the other 
hand, are likely to cut across recognizable social divisions. People 
face these latter risks either as isolated individuals or as members of 
rather more abstract and encompassing aggregates. This fact raises 
questions concerning the distribution of risk, not only among in-
dividuals, but also among groups. 
Finally, the circumstances of occupational risk are unique because 
of the political dimension they introduce. Labor and management ap-
proach each other as adversaries on a wide variety of workplace 
issues. Very often an issue concerning occupational safety will also 
be an issue concerning the control of the workplace. The presence of 
job hazards is then used as an example of how things can go wrong if 
management is allowed unrestricted discretion in making decisions 
concerning the organization and pace of work. On the other hand, 
militant action in favor of reducing occupational risks can sometimes 
be resisted, not because management is opposed to risk reduction, 
but because of a feeling that labor is too forcefully infringing upon 
management prerogatives to organize production. The general issue 
concerning control over the workplace therefore colors the issue of 
occupational risk. 19 
III. ETHICS AND GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
The previous discussion suggests that occupational safety and 
health is at least partly a matter of moral and social concern. But the 
justification of government involvement in the area is more and 
17. For example, the raw correlation between occupational risk and hourly wage is 
negative. See Thaler, supra note 13, at 290. 
18. For an indication of the group interest in workplace safety among southern textile 
workers see M. CONWAY, RISE GONNA RISE 58-75 (1979). 
19. For a description of the role of labor-management issues in occupational safety and 
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more frequently being stated in terms of market failure, not moral 
principle. The labor market, it is argued, does not provide sufficient 
information for workers and management to make informed deci-
sions about occupational risk. 20 Furthermore, because of transac-
tions costs, it would be more efficient to let government set national 
standards based upon a centralized body of knowledge concerning 
safety and health problems, especially in the areas where risks are 
likely to be misperceived or the effects are chronic rather than acute. 
In addition, the government provides compensation programs that 
prevent workers and management from bearing the full social costs 
of workplace illnesses and injuries. The government may legitimate-
ly, then, enforce a limited amount of command and control regula-
tion to deal with these information gaps and externalities.21 
This justification of government involvement is based upon consid-
erations of efficiency in the satisfaction of personal preferences. Ac-
cording to this view, the labor market does not provide an amount of 
safety on the job that maximizes the satisfaction of these individual 
preferences. Behind the market failure justification for government 
involvement there lies a utilitarian principle. Several other ethical 
bases for government involvement exist, however, that are not 
derived from a utilitarian tradition. For analytical purposes, the 
following discussion divides these justifications into those based on 
workers' rights, those based on distributive justice, and those based 
on public values. 
A. Workers'Rights 
The framework of individual rights provides one ethical perspec-
tive on the problem of occupational safety and health. This frame-
work emphasizes that people should be treated as ends and not as 
mere means. People have rights that protect them from others who 
would enslave them or otherwise use them for their own purposes. In 
bringing this idea to bear on the problem of occupational safety, 
many people have thought that workers have an inalienable right to 
health see D. BERMAN, DEATH ON THE JOB, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY STRUGGLES IN 
THE UNITED STATES (1978). For information on the general issue of control over the workplace 
see R. EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN (1979). 
20. This is especially true with respect to toxic substances. See 46 Fed. Reg. 4,412, 4,413-16 
(1981) (Dep't of Labor, OSHA, Hazards Identification). 
21. See Nichols & Zeckhauser, Government Comes to the Workplace: An Assessment of 
OSHA, 49 THE PUB. INTEREST 43 (1977). See also CHELIUS, supra note 10. For a statement of 
the "market failure" justification for government intervention in general see C.L. SCffiJLTZE, 
THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 29-46 (1977). 
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earn their living free from the ravages of job-caused death, disease, 
and injury.22 Philosophers have offered strong defenses of the right 
to be free of the infliction of cancer on the job.23 Behind this conten-
tion lies the idea that people need rights to protect them from unrea-
sonable health hazards where they earn their living. If the unre-
stricted market does not automatically satisfy this right to safety on 
the job, then the government must intervene in order to protect it. 
What does it mean to say that someone has a right to safety and 
health on the job? According to one view, people have rights to 
something when they have a valid claim upon society to protect them 
in the possession of it.24 This general idea does not specify whether 
the entitlement in question is negative (noninterference) or positive 
(recipience), or partly both.26 The right to safety and health on the 
job has sometimes been seen as derivative from the right not to be 
killed or severely injured by others.26 From this perspective, workers 
would have a negative right to noninterference and protection 
against persons who threaten life or limb in a direct way. On the 
other hand, a right to safety and health on the job can be construed 
as a species of a positive right to life.27 From this perspective, 
workers are entitled to that share of society's resources needed to 
provide a minimum level of protection against hazards on the job. 
This minimal level of protection obviously varies with the available 
resources of the community. For a given amount of resources, the 
minimal standard may not be the optimal level at which to provide 
safety and health on the job, but it provides a floor below which pro-
tection should not be allowed to fall. 
This right to minimum protection on the job is held by workers but 
it imposes duties on employers. These duties require employers to 
refrain from the use of hazardous materials or processes that would 
impose a significant risk of killing or seriously injuring workers-a 
negative duty corresponding to a negative right. Additionally, or 
alternatively, these duties could be construed to require adequate 
22. This is the way Rep. Philip Burton (D. Ill.) expressed the right to occupational safety and 
health. Quoted in Nichols, supra note 21, at 46. 
23. See Gewirth, Human Rights and the Prevention of Cancer, 17 AM. PmWSOPHICAL Q. 117 
(1980). For an opposing philosophical view that endorses a willingness-to-pay approach to 
public policy toward lifesaving see Bayles, The Price of Life, 89 ETmcs 20 (1978-79). 
24. This notion of rights is defended in J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, BOOK Vat 42-57 (1971). 
See also H. SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS (1978). 
25. For a discussion of positive and negative rights see C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110-14 
(1978). 
26. See Gewirth, supra note 23, at 117. 
27. A positive right to life is defended in McClosky, Right to Life, 84 MIND 403 (1975). 
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levels of protection against serious threats to worker safety and 
health-a positive duty corresponding to a positive right.28 These 
employer duties call for the expenditure of resources to provide safe-
ty on the job, either in form of opportunity costs or actual expend-
itures. The allocation of resources to the fulfillment of this duty has a 
certain priority over their allocation to the production of other com-
modities. The existence of a right to safety on the job, then, implies 
that the pursuit of private interest must take the provision of safety 
and health on the job as something of a side-constraint, although not 
necessarily an absolute one. 
A right to occupational safety and health would also have a certain 
priority over collective or social goals. According to one popular 
theory, rights are political trumps to the effect that the collective 
good is not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury 
on the individuals holding these rights.29 A more moderate view 
would allow some compromises between the satisfaction of rights 
and the satisfaction of common goals. Even if a more moderate view 
is adopted, however, a right to occupational safety and health could 
not be overridden by relatively minor increases in the satisfaction of 
some collective interest. 
The assignment of a safety right to workers still allows the 
possibility of trading the right for additional wages.30 A right to safe-
ty, however, could also be viewed as inalienable. On this view, 
market transactions involving the exchange of minimum safety and 
health protections for wages would not be allowed. The reason for 
this is to ensure that everyone would enjoy the substance of the 
right. This restriction does not necessarily prohibit all wage/risk 
transactions. One possibility would be to permit employers to charge 
workers (via lower wages) for the provision of extra safety over and 
above the social minimum. A further possibility would be to allow 
employers to charge for the provision of the social minimum. One 
could argue that just as a right to safe consumer products allows 
manufacturers to charge extra to make their products free of unrea-
sonable risks, so a right to occupational safety allows employers to 
28. Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(a)(1) 
(1976) states: "Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place 
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause 
death or serious physical harm to his employees." This section clearly imposes the duty to pro-
vide safe and healthful workplaces on employers. 
29. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
30. But see the Coasian analysis of wage differentials as resulting from worker liability, not 
the sale of worker rights in Chelius. The Control of Industrial Accidents: Economic Theory 
and Empirical Evidence, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 703 (1974). 
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charge extra to make their workplaces free of unreasonable risks. 
On the other hand, one could argue that the unavoidability of work 
makes the consumer product analogy inappropriate. On this view, 
the cost of providing worker safety is a cost of doing business, and 
must be passed on to the consumer or taken out of profits. 
Some people propose that jobs with unreasonable risks should be 
made available to workers if the alternative is unemployment.31 On 
the average, let us say, workers will be better off taking these risky 
jobs than being unemployed. It would therefore be rational for them 
to accept these jobs. Why prohibit them from doing so? This way of 
stating the issue may be misleading. A better way may be to ask 
whether these risky jobs should be made available at all. In effect, 
the provision of unsafe jobs offers one way of providing employment 
for the unemployed. It has to be evaluated, therefore, against other 
strategies for reducing unemployment, including a deliberate na-
tional policy of full and safe employment. One argument for such a 
policy might be that, in its absence, workers would face a choice be-
tween jobs with unreasonable risks and no jobs at all.32 
The framework of individual rights, then, may provide principles 
that justify government intervention in the area of occupational safe-
ty and health. Furthermore, the principle of ensuring minimal levels 
of safety and health protection provides some guidance in setting 
levels of effort in mandated programs. There are, however, some 
limitations on the framework of individual rights. 
The first reason the individual rights framework is limited is that it 
does not determine any particular level at which safety should be 
provided to workers. The right to safety and health on the job is not a 
right to an absolutely risk-free workplace, but only to a minimum 
amount of safety and health on the job. But what is the level of safety 
to which workers are entitled? Some philosophers have argued that 
workers have the right to the maximum feasible level of safety.33 But 
is this true? Suppose a worker faces an extremely low level of risk, so 
low that the worker cannot distinguish it from zero. This risk can, 
however, be lowered or eliminated at a large, but affordable, cost. Is 
31. This suggestion is made in ZECKHAUSER & NICHOLS, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS. AN OVERVIEW, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULA· 
TION, VOL. VI 163 (1978) (report prepared for the Senate Comm. on Gov't Affairs). 
32. A strong argument can be made that by banning extremely risky jobs society commits 
itself to providing jobs that are free of excessive risk. See A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: 
THE BIG TRADEOFF 21 (1975). 
33. For the view that people have the right to be protected against all but the most minimal 
risk of cancer see Gewirth, supra note 23, at 124. 
786 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:773 
this worker entitled to demand the safety expenditure as a matter of 
right? Recall that this expenditure is purely for a trivial reduction in 
the already small probability of illness or injury. It is not a case of 
someone demanding a large expenditure in order to avoid his or her 
own death or serious injury. It seems that no worker has such a 
right, and so no worker, except, perhaps, in special cases, has the 
right to the maximum feasible level of safety. This is not to argue 
that a collective goal of maximum feasible safety is unjustified, but it 
does suggest that if it is to be justified, one must look elsewhere than 
to a theory of individual rights. 
Once the idea of rights to maximal feasible safety is abandoned, no 
other choice for an appropriate level appears satisfactory. One way 
to see the difficulty is to note that the framework of rights focuses on 
the problem of occupational safety and health at the individual level. 
At this level, the problem is that workers are facing too high a prob-
ability of injury or illness on the job. But what probability of injury 
or illness on the job is a violation of an individual's rights? What prob-
ability of violating an individual's rights is itself a violation of his or 
her rights? The choice of one probability rather than another may ap-
pear arbitrary, and there seems to be no satisfactory mapping of 
other considerations onto these probabilities.34 
One attempt to deal with this problem introduces the idea of a 
standard threat. Rights provide guarantees not against all possible 
threats to their enjoyment, but only against standard threats. The 
notion of a standard threat is complex, but involves the ideas that the 
threats are (1) pervasive, common, ordinary; (2) serious; and (3) 
remediable, or feasibly resisted. What threats are standard is in part 
an empirical question, and may vary from context to context.36 This 
idea of standard threats probably captures the heart of the intuition 
that rights are involved in occupational safety and health. It does 
not, however, provide guidance as to what levels of risk are consis-
tent with an individual's rights. 
A second reason the individual rights framework may be inade-
quate lies in its attention to minimal levels of protection. It ties the 
right to safety and health to the notion of a minimally decent level of 
protection, assuming that those who lay claim to maximal levels, as a 
34. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 74-75 (1974). 
35. See SHUE, supra note 24, for the notion of a standard threat. He develops this idea fur-
ther in his article Exporting Hazards, to appear in BOUNDARIES: NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS 
LIMITS (P. Brown & H. Shue eds. 1981). The notion of standard threat captures the ideas of 
significant risk and feasibility that played a large part in the benzene and cotton dust deci-
sions. 
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matter of right, are wrong. But the question for public policy is best 
approached as this: what is the optimum level of protection to pro-
vide? The Occupational Safety and Health Act, for example, goes 
beyond the requirement to provide minimal levels of protection and 
suggests an interpretation of the optimal level of protection as the 
highest feasible level. 36 To the extent that it does this, the Act ap-
pears to go beyond the mere assignment of rights at a certain level of 
safety, and moves into the area of enforcing widely accepted public 
values concerning safety and health on the job. 
Finally, the individual rights framework fails to do justice to some 
of our considered judgments concerning the public health impact of 
safety and health hazards on the job. It may be, for instance, that the 
probabilities of harm facing each worker are so low as to escape the 
charge of posing a significant risk. Nevertheless, the number of peo-
ple exposed may be so large that a significant number of cases ap-
pears. At this point it may be reasonable to conclude that an insuffi-
cient level of protection is being provided, despite the fact that the 
risk facing each worker is perfectly consistent with the protection of 
his or her rights. 
B. Distributive Justice 
A second reason for the government to be involved in the area of 
occupational safety and health is to eliminate or reduce inequities in 
the distribution of occupational risks. The following example may 
clarify our intuitions about the idea of equal protection against oc-
cupational threats. Suppose firms were taxed at a fixed rate for each 
unit of worker exposure to a toxic substance. The result of this would 
be to encourage firms to control exposures up to the point where it 
becomes cheaper to pay the tax. Firms that could reduce toxic ex-
posures cheaply would provide more protection for their workers 
than would firms that could reduce toxic exposures only at great ex-
pense. Workers would therefore receive unequal protection against 
toxic substances depending upon whether their employing firm faced 
high or low marginal abatement costS.37 
36. See note 77 infra. See also the discussion of feasibility analysis, text at notes 76-100 in-
fra. 
37. Albert Nichols and Richard Zeckhauser suggest a tax on exposure to noise in the work-
place. See Nichols, supra note 21, at 66-67. See also Smith, The Feasibility of an 'Injury Tax' 
Approach to Occupational Safety, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 730 (1974) for a discussion of the 
technical details of the idea. The proposal to tax firms that do not provide safety is parallel to 
the idea of taxing firms that pollute the air or water. For a discussion of these effluent or emis-
sion charges see A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975). It 
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Why is this example unsettling? Certain intuitions about distribu-
tive justice are touched, but exactly what are they? Suppose that dif-
ferent plants provide unequal protection, but none is so lax that it 
violates the threshold level of protection guaranteed by right. Is any 
worker being treated unfairly? What if no rights were being violated, 
but there were extreme inequalities in protection? What if the extra 
risks were borne disproportionately by the powerless and the poor? 
A review of several approaches to distributive justice may provide 
a way to address these questions. Utilitarian and procedural views 
regarding distributive justice provide some guidance. A utilitarian 
approach to the distribution of occupational risks would call for 
whatever distribution maximizes total or average utility. If we sup-
pose, in the spirit of welfare economics, that ideal markets maximize 
utility, or at least achieve Pareto optimality,38 the most natural ap-
plication of the utilitarian approach to occupational safety and health 
would result in support for market mechanisms, except in the case of 
demonstrated market failure. In the above example, this would 
therefore call for setting the tax so as to produce the efficient level of 
protection against health impairment. The utilitarian approach, 
then, supports the intuition that a distribution of risks based upon 
abatement costs may be just.39 
A utilitarian approach to justice may be contrasted with a pro-
cedural approach. It provides that whatever distribution results 
from fair principles of acquisition and transfer is just. Hence, no 
overriding aim in the distribution of safety and health on the job 
needs to be specified, and no governmental action is needed to 
achieve a predetermined end state. Instead, occupational risks are 
allocated in an occupational risk market in which workers receive 
wage premiums for risky work. The model here is a gamble in which 
should be noted that a policy of marketable permits to pollute or to reduce safety in the work-
place does not avoid the distributional problem mentioned above, namely, the arbitrariness of 
distributing safety (or clean air and water) on the basis of firms' marginal abatement costs. 
For a discussion of the differences between a tax policy and a permit policy see Tietenberg, 
Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary Source Air Pollution: A Survey 
and Synthesis, 56 LAND ECONOMICS 391 (1980). 
38. A nontechnical summary is provided in Varian, Distributive Justice, Welfare Eco-
nomics, and the Theory of Fairness in PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMIC THEORY (F. Hahn & M. 
Hollis eds. 1979). A state of affairs is Pareto optimal when some groups can be made better off 
only by making other groups worse off. 
39. This is not to say that utilitarian views imply antiegalitarian policies. Many utilitarians, 
for instance, use the principle of diminishing marginal utility to argue for an equal distribution 
of income. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932). Utilitarians, however, favor 
egalitarian policies only insofar as they increase total or average utility. Extreme inequalities 
in the distribution of job risks, then, are not inherently objectionable for utilitarians. 
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the conditions are fair, the bets are made voluntarily, no one cheats, 
etc. In a fair gamble involving money, whatever distribution of cash 
results is just. In this view, the occupational risk market, to the ex-
tent that it resembles a fair lottery, would be governed by pure pro-
cedural justice in which there is no independent criterion for the 
right result.40 Those who hold this view would reject the setting of a 
"toxic exposure" tax as an imposition of a social goal that il-
legitimately overrides just principles of transfer and acquisition.41 
Utilitarian and procedural approaches to distributive justice, then, 
tend to work against a policy goal of reducing inequalities in the 
distribution of occupational risk. The utilitarian would substitute 
overall efficiency for that goal; the procedural approach would deny 
that any goal should be set. A more hopeful basis for this policy may 
lie in egalitarian conceptions that tie justice to equality on a 
theoretical level. 42 The following are several possible principles of 
justice in the distribution of occupational risk that could be examined 
in such an egalitarian framework. 
The first principle declares that extreme inequality in the dangers 
associated with different jobs is in itself objectionable. It is not fair 
on this view that illnesses and injuries should be concentrated in par-
ticular jobs, occupations, and industries. The mere inequality in risk, 
and not just its distribution among nonoccupational groups, is objec-
tionable. Some policy implications of this view are that high-risk in-
dustries should be targeted first, that exposure levels to toxic 
substances should be set at background levels, and that where risks 
cannot be eliminated they should be spread more equally among a 
larger population. 
A second principle objects to extreme inequality in the prevalence 
of occupational illnesses and injuries among certain nonoccupational 
groups. It is not fair, on this view, that occupational illnesses and in-
juries should fall disproportionately on the poor, minorities, and the 
powerless. Nor should extra risks fall on people in morally irrelevant 
groups such as those who work in medium-size establishments or 
those for whom abatement costs are especially high. The difference 
between the two principles is that the first objects to any unequal 
distribution of occupational risks while the second objects only when 
40. For a defense of the procedural view see NOZICK, supra note 34. For a discussion of pure 
procedural justice see RAWLS, supra note 11, at 86. 
41. For example, Robert Nozick argues that a market in air pollution permits is objection-
able because it requires a central authority to set overall clean air goals. See NOZICK, supra 
note 34, at 81. 
42. For the most elaborate example of current egalitarian views see RAWLS, supra note 11. 
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the distribution has been determined in what seems an unjust way. A 
policy implication of the second principle is that special attention and 
effort should be given to those groups that experience extra occupa-
tional risk because they are poor, powerless, or victims of il-
legitimate discrimination. 
These two principles each suggest that large increases in efficiency 
would be needed to balance the loss in equity resulting from the ap-
plication of market principles such as a "toxic exposure" tax. A third 
principle might propose that, if occupational risk is concentrated in 
groups that are already disadvantaged, programs for the reduction 
of occupational risk should have priority over programs to reduce 
risks that are spread more evenly throughout the general population. 
Thus, if we have to choose between saving an equal number of 
asbestos workers and motorists, equity considerations should make 
us favor the asbestos workers.43 
All three distributive principles are in need of further theoretical 
support. They do not, moreover, specify the extent to which these 
egalitarian goals should be pursued in the face of conflicts with other 
goals. In addition, they are silent on the overall level of protection we 
should provide. They, therefore, do not determine the level of effort 
at which government programs in this area should operate. More 
complete guidance for occupational safety and health policy might be 
found by referring to widely shared public values that lie behind the 
concern over workplace safety. 
c. Public Values 
The concept of public values provides an important ethical justifi-
cation for government involvement in occupational safety and 
health. This perspective is based on a distinction between individ-
uals' preferences for their own personal welfare and their values and 
moral principles concerning the kind of society they think desirable 
or the collective policies they think worthwhile.44 These public values 
43. This example is used by Nicholas Ashford. See Ashford, The Usefulness of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis in Decisions Concerning Health, Safety, and the Environment, in Joint Hearings on 
the Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis by Regulatory Agencies, before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations and the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980). 
44. Similar distinctions between public and private preferences or values are made by Har-
sanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 
J. OF POL. ECON. 315 (1955); Marglin, The Social Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of In-
vestment, 77 Q.J. OF ECON. 93 (1963); Arrow, Values and Collective Decision-Making, in HAHN, 
supra note 38, at 116-17; Thurow, A Theory of Groups and Economic Redistribution, 9 PHILOS-
OPHY & PUB. AFF. 31-32 (1979). For a discussion of environmental policy in terms of the con-
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can concern the rules to be followed in the pursuit of private inter-
ests (such as property rights) or they can address some concrete 
common concern like national defense or environmental quality. 
When adopted by the community these public values become collec-
tive goals. 
Not all public values are well defined. There is often no consensus 
supporting them; the criteria for community acceptance are not 
always clear. Yet in the case of occupational safety and health these 
concerns are not always problematical. One public value at stake in 
the question of government involvement in occupational safety and 
health, for example, is the uncontroversial belief that a society in 
which fewer people are killed or seriously disabled on the job is, other 
things being equal, better than a society in which more people are 
killed or seriously disabled on the job. This value may derive from a 
more basic judgment that people have a dignity and a worth that 
make it wrong to use them as mere means to any end including effi-
ciency. This judgment leads to the idea that a special regard for the 
health and safety of workers is required to avoid treating them sim-
ply as components in the production process. This moral ideal 
underlies the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 
which established job safety and health as a national goal. 45 
From the perspective of public values, the problem of occupational 
safety and health is not simply that occupational risks are inequitably 
distributed and that individuals are receiving less protection against 
threats to their safety and health on the job than they are entitled to 
by right. The problem is, in addition, that the level of injury and ill-
ness may be unacceptably high, even if rights are respected and the 
distribution of job risk is equitable. Both rights and justice are impor-
tant public values. But if too many workers are killed or disabled on 
the job, the public may determine that the meager level of effort 
devoted to the reduction of this toll displays a disregard for the value 
we place on human life. 
This evaluation of occupational safety is not necessarily ac-
complished by examining risks at the individual level. We may want 
to prohibit hazardous activities that are fully rational for each in-
dividual even when there are no violations of rights or justice in-
volved. Recall the coffee example mentioned earlier. For a more ex-
trast between self-regarding preferences and public values see Sagoff, Economic Them,,!! IIlId 
Environmental Law, 79 MICH L. REV. 1393 (1981). 
45. The Supreme Court's decision in the cotton dust case supports this "public values" 
interpretation of the Act. See text at note 89 infra. 
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treme example, imagine a nonoccupational death lottery in which 
people could accept a risk of death in return for a cash payment. 46 
The death risks and the payments could probably be arranged so that 
many people would play. But deliberation regarding whether to 
allow such a death lottery would concern more than the size of the 
death risk, the monetary compensation involved, and the individuals 
or groups likely to play. It would also concern such matters as 
whether·a sufficient respect for the value of life was displayed by this 
type of transaction, and whether the value of individual choice in the 
matter outweighed the damage done to the value of life. Also rele-
vant would be the purposes behind the death lottery and the social 
outcomes to be expected, which would vary even if the individual-
level death risks did not. 
In the occupational risk market, where the group outcomes are 
often regular and predictable, the perspective of public values would 
similarly require a direct consideration of the importance of the ac-
tivities producing these outcomes. The role of government would be 
to reflect this evaluation and to regulate or prohibit certain activities 
on the job when the outcomes that would result violate this public 
judgment. 
To approach occupational safety on the basis of public values, 
however, is to encounter a familiar problem. The approach justifies 
some degree of government involvement, but does not specify the 
level. Moreover, it has a special difficulty in explaining why society 
has more of an interest in regulating the outcomes of occupational 
risks than in regulating other risk-taking behavior. The beginnings 
of an answer are to be found in the social nature of employment, the 
fact that it is not an avoidable activity, and the irreversible and non-
compensable nature of injury and death. But more work would have 
to be done to distinguish the cases so as to avoid the use of principles 
that would also justify intrusiveness and intolerance. 
IV. ECONOMIC CRITERIA 
While moral principles involving rights, justice, and public values 
may help to justify centralized programs regulating occupational 
safety and health, they do not completely determine the level of 
government effort required. It has been suggested that various 
economic criteria may be used to supplement these moral principles 
46. The rise of "Toughman" contests in which unemployed steel and auto workers are 
recruited for amateur boxing exhibitions suggests that this example is not entirely fanciful. 
The frequency of death in these contests is alarming. 
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in determining a desirable level of effort. This section examines the 
economic approach to occupational safety and health. It focuses on 
the difficulties in applying economic techniques in this area, notes 
some tensions between the use of these techniques and the nor-
mative considerations just discussed, and attempts to sketch an ap-
propriate role for these techniques. 
According to this economic approach, the goal of occupational 
safety and health policy should be to minimize the sum of workplace 
accident costs and workplace accident prevention costs, or 
equivalently, to maximize the difference between the benefits of 
workplace safety programs and the costs of these programs.47 A 
number of techniques have been proposed to achieve this goal. They 
divide into cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit rules. A program is 
cost-effective when it maximizes its objectives for a given cost, or 
minimizes its cost for a given objective. A program is cost-beneficial 
when its benefits exceed its costs. The cost-benefit criterion goes 
beyond the cost-effectiveness criterion in assigning a monetary value 
to the benefits involved, thereby allowing direct comparisons of the 
positive and negative consequences of a program in monetary 
terms.48 In examining the economic approach it is helpful to treat 
these criteria separately. 
A. Cost-Effectiveness 
Cost-effectiveness criteria were never intended to determine 
levels of safety. They presuppose that the desirable level of effort 
has already been set or that some cost constraint has already been 
imposed. The major use for cost-effectiveness approaches is not in 
setting levels, then, but in achieving in an efficient way goals deter-
mined on some other basis. Even this role, however, is limited by the 
need to balance efficiency against other values. 
Despite this inherent limitation, cost-effectiveness can be a useful 
measure of the desirability of alternative workplace safety and 
47. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (arguing for the cost minimization 
goal). James R. Chelius states the equivalent benefits maximization policy in Chelius, supra 
note 30, at 702. For general arguments and empirical data supporting the economic approach 
see SMITH, supra note 2, and J. MILLER III & B. YANDLE, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL 
REGULATION (1979). See also Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) (requiring 
cost-benefit analysis and mandating that "regulatory objectives be chosen to maximize the net 
benefits to society"). 
48. The difference between cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis is well-known. See, 
e.g., L. ANDERSON & R. SETTLE, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 16-17 (1977). 
For a discussion of the contrast in the context of regulatory policy see L. LAVE, THE STRATEGY 
OF SOCIAL REGULATION 19-25 (1981). 
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health programs. Consider, for example, the problem of what to do 
about noise in the workplace. Suppose that one program calls for the 
use of engineering controls as a way of preventing cases of hearing 
impairment; another calls for the use of hearing protectors that pre-
vent the same number of cases of hearing impairment, but at a much 
lower cost. In this hypothetical example, a cost-effectiveness ap-
proach would favor the use of the less expensive hearing protectors. 
Only rarely, however, is the choice quite that simple. The actual con-
troversy in the case of noise in the workplace is whether hearing pro-
tectors do in fact provide the same level of protection as engineering 
controls.49 If the less expensive hearing protectors provide less pro-
tection, then the fact that they are less expensive does not make 
them more cost-effective. Alternative programs can be compared 
with respect to cost-effectiveness only when they achieve the same 
level of effect or impose the same costs. 
Some misunderstandings of this point have resulted in the idea 
that a program that imposes the lowest average or marginal cost per 
accident avoided is cost-effective, while programs with higher unit 
costs are not cost-effective. 50 This is not so. If the program that 
avoids more accidents or injuries has higher unit costs, this may 
reflect the familiar fact of diminishing returns, and indicates that if 
we want to avoid more incidents it will simply cost us more per inci-
dent to do it. Relative to our objectives, each program may be equally 
efficient. 
Some analysts who use a cost-effectiveness framework propose to 
equalize the marginal cost per incident avoided. 51 An example of this 
approach would be to set different levels of exposure to toxic 
substances for different industry segments depending upon the cost 
49. For a discussion of the effectiveness of ear protection see 46 Fed. Reg. 4,078, 4,111-12 
(1981). 
50. This is especially true in some studies published by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency. See UNITED STATES ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, KRAFT PULPING 8-37 
(1978) (the three regulatory alternatives having the highest marginal cost per ton of emissions 
removed are rejected as "not being cost-effective"). 
Even as sophisticated an observer as Lester Lave can abuse the notion of cost-effectiveness. 
"Comparing the cost of preventing an adverse health effect under the oxident and toxic 
substances standards shows that the former is not cost-effective." See LAVE, supra note 48, at 
108. What he means is that the cost per case prevented is greater under the oxident standard 
than under the toxic substances standard. In itself, this gives us no indication of its economic 
value and does not address the efficiency question of whether the oxident standard achieves its 
goal at lowest cost. 
51. Peter S. Albin draws attention to "the efficiency requirement that the number of lives 
saved per dollar of expenditure should be equal at the margin," in S. HOOK, HUMAN VALUES 
AND ECONOMIC POLICY 96 (S. Hook ed. 1976). 
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required to control exposures. 52 If this is done, then the number of 
cases avoided will be maximized for any given level of expenditure. 
However, the distribution of cases avoided will differ from that 
determined by a policy that requires equal protection for all. To 
equalize the marginal cost of safety conflicts with considerations of 
distributive justice53 that could motivate government programs. 
More telling, perhaps, in the context of trying to determine levels, is 
that this cost-effectiveness rule does not specify at what level 
marginal costs should be set, or what should be the total social cost of 
the regulation. 
Another cost-effectiveness rule would concentrate attention on the 
accidents or injuries that can be avoided most cheaply. The policy 
recommendation here is to set priorities and levels for safety pro-
grams on the basis of the lowest unit costs. 54 The rationale is this: if 
we proceed up the supply curve for lives saved in this way, then no 
matter where we stop spending, we will have maximized the number 
of lives saved for the amount spent. One difficulty with this recom-
mendation is that it is likely to conflict both with the goal of 
targeting high risk industries and groups first and with the goal of 
providing equal protection across groupS.55 Moreover, it does not 
take account of the total number of lives saved by a particular safety 
program. For example, when we choose which of two toxic sub-
stances to regulate first, it may be better to give priority to the sub-
stance that produces more illnesses and fatalities rather than the one 
that has the lowest per unit prevention costs. This would maximize 
the number of lives saved in a given period of time although it would 
be at an increased cost per life saved. Finally, the policy of saving the 
"cheapest" lives first does not solve the problem of levels since it 
does not specify at what point we should stop spending to save lives. 
B. Cost-Benefit 
From within a cost-benefit framework, the limitations on cost-
effectiveness criteria appear to stem from the lack of a monetary 
value for the benefits of occupational safety and health programs. 
52. This suggestion was made for the case of cotton dust by the Council on Wage and Price 
Stability in their testimony in the rulemaking hearing on cotton dust. COUNCIL ON W AGE AND 
PRICE STABILITY, PROPOSED STANDARD ON COTTON DUST (1977) (comments before the 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Docket No. H-052). 
53. See text at notes 37-43 supra. 
54. The cheap lives first rule is discussed in Zeckhauser & Shepard, Where Now for Saving 
Lives?, 40 LAW & CONTEMP_ PROB. 16 (1976); and Singer, How to Reduce Risks Rationally, 51 
THE PUB. INTEREST 100 (1978). 
55. See text at notes 37-43 supra. 
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The cost-benefit approach attempts to move beyond the cost-effec-
tiveness approach by placing a monetary value on these benefits. 
Cost-effectiveness analysis measures the benefits of safety and 
health programs in their natural units-lives saved, number of cases 
of hearing impairment avoided, and overall reductions in occupa-
tional illnesses and injuries. Cost-benefit analysis transforms these 
"naturally" measured benefits into monetary terms by specifying an 
appropriate monetary value. Since the economic costs of safety and 
health programs are already in dollar units, a direct comparison of 
benefits and costs is possible in terms of a single common measure. 
With this common metric, it is possible to examine clearly whether 
the benefits of a safety and health program exceed the costs. 
A formal cost-benefit analysis, then, requires monetary values for 
the lives saved and illnesses avoided by safety and health programs. 
But these items are not typically bought and sold on markets, and so 
there is no prevailing price to use as a measuring rod. There has been 
much research, therefore, attempting to measure these benefits indi-
rectly. However, a review of the two principal methods used to value 
the benefits of programs that save lives reveals severe technical and 
theoretical difficulties. The first method attempts to assess the social 
costs of lost lives. Essentially, this amounts to estimating the future 
earnings of those whose lives would be saved by the program and dis-
counting this estimate to its present value. The benefits of life-saving 
programs are then measured as reductions in these social costs. 56 
Critics argue cogently that the social cost approach confuses the con-
tribution people make to the gross national product with their social 
worth; the value of their livelihood with the value of their lives. It has 
the ethically unacceptable implications that poor people are worth 
less than the rich, women are worth less than men, blacks worth less 
than whites, and old people who have no income worth nothing at all. 
To remedy these difficulties, it has been suggested that a second ap-
proach be tried that uses the traditional economic criterion of will-
ingness to pay. 57 
56. Sometimes medical costs are added to discounted future earnings to form a more com-
plete picture of social costs. See D. Rice, Social and Economic Implications of Cancer in the 
United States (paper presented to the Expert Committee on Cancer Statistics of the World 
Health Organization and International Agency for Research of Cancer, Madrid, Spain, June 20 
to 26, 1978). See also Mushkin & Collings, Economic Costs of Disease and Injury, 73 PUB. 
HEALTH REP. 795 (1959). 
57. For general criticisms of the social costs approach and arguments in favor of a willing-
ness to pay approach see Schelling, supra note 9, and Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: A 
Theoretical Approach, 79 J. OF POL. ECON. 687-705 (1971). Further theoretical discussion of 
the relation between the discounted future earnings approach and the willingness to pay ap-
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This willingness-to-pay approach is the favored approach in the 
economics profession, largely because it has a solid basis in welfare 
economics.68 A straightforward application of this traditional criter-
ion is blocked, however, by the fact that there appears to be little 
sense in asking what payment an individual would make to escape 
certain death. The accepted solution to this problem is to ask a differ-
ent question: what would individuals be willing to pay to reduce the 
probability of death when these probabilities are very small? The 
monetary value of a person's life is not determined by this proce-
dure, but a monetary value of personal safety is. Once this value is 
available, then a monetary value of the benefits of a life-saving pro-
gram can be calculated as the number of people at risk times the 
probability of death times the value of safety. 69 
The most widespread method of calculating the value of safety is 
based upon labor market studies.60 The labor market is assumed to 
function as an occupational risk market in which worker demand 
curves for safety and management safety supply curves intersect in 
a series of equilibrium points. Attempts are then made to measure 
the slope of the curve that these market equilibria trace out. This 
slope represents the wage differential for extra risk and is used as a 
measure of the value of safety. 
There are some technical problems with this approach.61 First, the 
evidence is mixed on the existence of these compensating wage dif-
ferentials. Some studies show the expected positive coefficient, in-
dicating that hazardous work pays more; some show a negative one, 
indicating that hazardous work pays less; and some show a coeffi-
cient that cannot be statistically distinguished from zero at the usual 
levels of confidence, suggesting that level of risk has no influence on 
wage rates. It is not even clear that there is a risk market then. Sec-
proach can be found in Conley, The Value of Human Life in the Demand for Safety, 66 AM. 
ECON. REV. 45 (1976); and G.W. JONES-LEE, THE VALUE OF LIFE (1976). 
58. This trend is reflected in an increased use of the willingness to pay measure in recent 
studies. See J. Graham & J. Vaupel, The Value of Life: What Difference Does It Make? 2 (Oct. 
1980) (paper prepared for the National Academy of Science Comm. on Risk and Decision Mak-
ing). 
59. For a clear statement of the difference between the value of life and the value of safety 
see Kneese & D' Arge, Benefit Analysis and Today's Regulatory Problems, in THE BENEFITS OF 
HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION (A. Ferguson & E.P. LeVeen eds. 1981). The value of safe-
ty, moreover, clearly increases with the level of risk. 
60. The pioneering study is Thaler, supra note 13. 
61. For reviews of the labor market studies on the value of safety and some of their 
technical difficulties see Smith, Compensating Wage Differentials and Public Policy: A 
Review, 32 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 339 (1979); and Brown, Equalizing Differences in the 
Labor Market, 94 Q.J. OF ECON. 113 (1980). 
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ond, even if a positive coefficient is found, it does not represent a 
worker demand curve for safety, but the intersection of worker de-
mand curves and management supply curves. For small changes in 
the risk of death this does not matter, since, at market equilibrium, 
the amount workers are willing to pay for safety is theoretically the 
same as the amount management is willing to spend on it. But, con-
ceptually, it is important to note that the estimated coefficient 
measures management willingness to supply safety as much as it 
measures worker demand for it. Third, the estimated coefficient may 
or may not represent an adequately functioning risk market. Lack of 
knowledge, power, or mobility may prevent workers from express-
ing their full desire for compensation. Fourth, since the loss of life 
cannot be measured objectively, there is no way to tell whether the 
observed compensation is adequate or not. 
Further, a dilemma threatens the entire wage differential ap-
proach to estimating the value of safety. If risk markets are fully 
functioning, then workers receive full compensation for bearing risk, 
and there is no need for government intervention, because any man-
dated program above and beyond those already in place would cost 
management more than the fully compensated workers are willing to 
pay for it. On the other hand, if the markets are not fully functioning, 
then the estimated value of safety bears no systematic relation to the 
real value. It would then be illegitimate to value the benefits of a pro-
gram designed to increase occupational safety in a malfunctioning 
occupational risk market on the basis of unreliable estimates of the 
value of safety drawn from these very same malfunctioning 
markets. 62 
There is an even more fundamental objection to the wage differen-
tial measure. A formal cost-benefit analysis needs a measure of what 
people are willing to pay for a program that saves lives. What the 
wage differential coefficient represents, however, is willingness to 
pay for personal safety, not life-saving programs. The two are by no 
means the same. The value we want is what people are willing to 
spend for a social program that will fundamentally alter the options 
available on the occupational risk market; we, therefore, want to 
measure individual preferences for structural changes in the labor 
market. Wage differentials, however, represent people's prefer-
ences within a given structure of occupational risk, not what they 
62. This objection would not apply, of course, to estimates of the value of safety derived 
from studies of behavior outside the labor market, for example, from studies of seat belt or 
smoke detector prices. But then the problem is one of relevance: why should the value people 
place on safety away from work bear any systematic relation to the value of safety in the total-
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would prefer in a labor market with an altered structure.63 It is possi-
ble that valuation under the present and the altered structure are 
systematically related, but individual preferences for structural 
change in the occupational risk market would have to be measured 
somehow before this could be established. But if they can be esti-
mated directly, why bother with a surrogate measure? 
These difficulties apply to estimates of the wage differentials for 
injury and non-fatal illness as well. It appears then that the attempt 
to value the benefits of occupational safety and health programs via 
wage differentials is not likely to produce useful estimates. If so, the 
option of using cost-benefit criteria to set levels of effort for govern-
ment occupational safety and health programs is considerably less 
attractive. 
Economic cost-benefit criteria in general suffer from a more basic 
limitation that makes them less desirable as public policy guides. 
They are designed to promote efficiency in the satisfaction of per-
sonal preferences. The notions of Pareto optimality and Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency that underlie these criteria are admittedly one-sided 
in their neglect of individual rights, distributive justice, and public 
values.64 For this reason, economic criteria may underdetermine the 
level of governmental effort required in the area of occupational 
safety and health. Only if some further reason justifies giving pride 
of place to efficiency in the satisfaction of private preferences can 
economic criteria, as traditionally applied, be the principal basis for 
setting levels of effort in this area.65 
It may be possible to use ingenious techniques to incorporate dis-
tributional considerations and other public values into cost-benefit 
analyses. Even so, economic criteria may still have a limited role in 
occupational safety and health decisions. The political preferences 
ly different context of work? 
63. Bayles, note 23 supra, confuses willingness to pay for personal safety and willingness to 
pay for life-saving programs in his defense of a willingness to pay approach. 
64. For a definition of Pareto optimality see note 38 supra. A change is Kaldor-Hicks effi-
cient when those who gain from the change can compensate those who lose because of it. For a 
discussion of these points see J. DE V AN GRAAFF, THEORETICAL WELFARE ECONOMICS (1957); 
LM.D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS (2nd ed. 1957); E.J. MISHAN, COS1' 
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 382-415 (1976). An attempt to integrate distributional considerations into 
cost-benefit analysis can be found at Weisbroad, Income Redistribution Effects & Benefit-Cost 
Analysis, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS, (S. Chase ed. 1968); and Harrison, Distri-
butional Objectives in Health and Safety Regulation, in THE BENEFITS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY 
REGULATION (A. Ferguson & E.P. LeVeen eds. 1981). 
65. For useful summaries of criticisms of cost-benefit analysis see SELF, ECONOCRATS AND 
THE POLICY PROCESS (1975) and SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION OF THE HOUSE 
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: WONDER TOOL OR 
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and moral ideals of citizens are poorly represented in a market or 
surrogate market approach. People sometimes want certain social 
goals to be achieved, not because there is any personal gain in it for 
them, but simply because they think it is the right thing to do. The 
only wayan economic analysis can capture these public ideals is by 
first pricing them. The defect in this procedure is not simply that 
people are not used to placing a monetary value on their ideals, but 
that it substitutes a measure of the strength of a preference for an 
evaluation of an ideal. The evaluation of an ideal, however, is a com-
pletely normative undertaking, and is properly done through public 
discussion, argument, and debate, rather than by assessing the in-
tensity of people's preferences. It might be better, then, to see if the 
ideals that stand behind our public commitment to occupational safe-
ty and health can enter materially into public policy without first be-
ing priced by economic techniques. 
If economic criteria are not to be the sole basis for occupational 
safety and health policy, what role should they play in this area? 
Some economists recommend that cost-benefit criteria be used as 
basic guidelines in standard-setting, qualified, if necessary, by equity 
and other considerations.66 Others recommend that cost-benefit 
analysis be done to measure the efficiency impact of policies only. 
The idea would be to balance economic efficiency as one of a number 
of perhaps equally important social values.67 This multidimensional 
approach may be attractive; it requires us, however, to specify tech-
niques other than those available within cost-benefit analysis to bal-
ance efficiency against other normative considerations. The follow-
ing section examines some possible ways in which this may be done. 
MIRAGE, H.R. Doc. No. 96, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1980) [hereinafter cited as WONDER TOOL]' 
66. T.C. Schelling has made the case for the priority of economics in the area of risk reduc-
tion by arguing that reasons against the use of economic criteria "ought to be explicitly ad-
dressed as qualifications to a principle that makes economic sense, rather than as 'first prin-
ciples' that transcend economics." See Schelling, supra note 9, at 147-48. 
67. Lee G. Anderson and Russell F. Settle note that "benefit-cost analysis is designed 
primarily to study the efficiency implications of projects. There are, of course, many other 
aspects that must be considered such as political acceptability, legality, and income-distribu-
tional effects." ANDERSON, supra note 48, at 15-16. See also Mishan, How Valid are Economic 
Evaluations of Allocative Changes? 14 J. OF ECON. ISSUES 143 (1980). For the view that a legis-
lative process should be used to set a trade-off value between economic efficiency and impor-
tant noneconomic objectives of public programs, see Maas, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its 
Relevance to Public Investment Decisions. 80 Q.J. OF ECONOMICS 208 (1966). 
A major defect of these views, however, is their recognition of only one other value (as op-
posed to practical consideration) that needs to be taken into account, namely distributive 
justice or equality. For an explicit statement of the view that the only competitor with efficien-
cy is equality see OKUN, supra note 32. Guido Calabresi, supra note 47, discusses the need for a 
political trade-off between the two goals of accident law: justice and cost reduction. For 
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V. ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC POLICY PRINCIPLES 
Economic criteria cannot be the sole basis for public policy toward 
occupational safety and health because they do not adequately take 
into account the public concerns that motivated government involve-
ment in this area. The Occupational Safety and Health Act was 
passed to make the workplace safer, not necessarily more efficient. 
The public remains concerned, moreover, with the nature of work-
place hazards, their distribution, and the degree to which workers 
have a say in controlling the risks they face on the job. However, in 
attempting to carry out its mandate, OSHA has been criticized for 
failing to take into account important economic constraints. If we ac-
cept the conclusion of the previous section, that economic criteria 
cannot be the sole basis for occupational safety and health policy, the 
question arises whether principles can be devised or guidelines sug-
gested that would both respect economic limits and satisfy public 
values. Three current proposals for doing this will be described here. 
One suggestion would be to put a total or unit cost constraint on 
workplace safety expenditures. Another approach draws upon 
decision-theory to formulate risk-averse strategies. A final approach 
is the OSHA strategy of feasibility analysis. 
A. Cost Containment Strategies 
The first cost containment strategy is to adopt a limit on the total 
amount that can be spent on worker safety and health in a given 
period. One proposal to do this is the regulatory budget. According 
to this idea, the level of resources to be mandated each year on oc-
cupational safety and health programs would be set by Congress. 
OSHA could not mandate expenditures above this level, although 
firms could spend more than the mandated amount if they wished. 
While the details of this proposal are not fully worked out, the 
general idea is widely discussed and has some congressional sup-
port.68 Its chief strength is that by fixing a budget outside the proc-
ess of setting safety and health standards it allows the use of the 
cost-effectiveness rules discussed earlier to determine an ap-
propriate level of worker protection. For example, the cost-effective-
ness policy of saving the "cheapest" lives first could be followed and 
a stopping point would be reached when the budget was exhausted. 
There are several objections to this idea. First, the proper size of 
criticism see DworkIn, Is Wealth a Value? 9 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980). 
68. See DeMuth, The Regulatory Budget, 4 REGULATION 29 (1980). This approach is recom-
mended in the minority views in WONDER TOOL, supra note 63. 
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the budget cannot be determined on cost grounds alone. A large ex-
penditure on safety and health may be worth every penny, while a 
small expenditure may be wasteful. A safety expenditure that would 
return net economic benefits, for example, could be ruled out by a 
regulatory budget. Second, by focusing attention on the cost of 
regulations, the regulatory budget encourages the development of 
inexpensive regulations, not effective ones. Third, there are a host of 
practical and administrative difficulties whose resolution appears 
unlikely. 69 
A second cost containment strategy would be to cap the unit cost 
of occupational safety and health programs. Suppose, for example, 
that it could be decided to spend no more than $3 million per life 
saved in an occupational safety program. Then OSHA could mandate 
safety programs up to the point where the marginal or average cost 
to save a life equals $3 million. Programs that would save lives at 
greater unit cost would not be pursued. 
It is important to note that this proposal differs from the proposal 
to determine appropriate levels of safety by estimating what in-
dividuals are willing to pay for personal safety on the job. The in-
dividual willingness-to-pay measure relies on market or surrogate 
market analyses, and does not capture people's political preferences 
for structural change in the occupational risk market.70 The unit cost 
containment strategy, however, need not rely on market-like an-
alyses; nor need it only reflect personal preferences for safety. Con-
gress, for example, could reflect a collective decision to pay no more 
than a certain amount for avoiding a workplace fatality. Or surveys 
could be taken to discover not what people are willing to pay for their 
own safety, but how much people are willing to spend per life saved 
to increase safety for workers in general.71 One could, therefore, re-
69. For example, the regulatory budget requires an accounting identification of mandated 
safety and health expenditures by affected firms. But such expenditures are often made in 
conjunction with general plant and' equipment purchases or provide the occasion for firms to 
install new equipment that is both more productive and safer. Any accounting separation of 
these joint costs will be conceptually arbitrary. See DeMuth, supra note 68, and LAVE, supra 
note 48, at 19-23, for further discussion of these difficulties. 
70. See text at notes 61 to 63 supra. 
71. In one such study, for example, people were asked both what they were willing to pay 
for a heart attack program that would reduce their own chances of dying and what they were 
willing to pay for such a program that saved a certain number of lives per year. See Acton, 
Measuring the Monetary Value of Lifesaving Programs, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. !'ROB. 66 (1976). 
For further use of the survey approach to assess public attitudes toward risk see Fischhoff, 
"How Safe is Safe Enough?" 9 POL'y SCI. 127 (1978); ENERGy-RISK MANAGEMENT 7-19 (W. 
Rowe & G. Goodman eds. 1979); SocIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT: How SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 
129-42 (R. Schwing & W. Albers eds. 1980). 
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ject the estimates of the value of safety drawn from labor market 
studies, and still adopt a unit cost constraint strategy. 
This suggestion maintains some of the advantages of the economic 
criteria discussed earlier,72 namely, a sense of overall efficiency and 
some consistency across programs. There are disadvantages as well. 
It is not clear that all the benefits of occupational safety and health 
programs can be treated in this way. Reaching some kind of political 
consensus on life-saving programs is not totally out of the question, 
but occupational safety and health programs prevent permanently 
disabling illnesses and injuries that often lead to premature death. 
Under a cost containment approach, how should the benefits of 
avoiding byssinosis, a chronically disabling lung disease affecting 
cotton textile workers, be evaluated against the benefits of avoiding 
silicosis, a different chronically disabling lung disease affecting sand 
blaster and miners? Do we have special surveys? Does Congress 
reflect a national consensus on each and every type of occupational 
disease and injury? Clearly, much would have to be delegated to 
OSHA for administrative judgment under such a strategy. But once 
removed from the political arena in this way the normative justifica-
tion for these decisions, namely, that they reflect a national consen-
sus, is much weaker. 
There is a second difficulty. It may be unwise to apply the same 
cost constraint to all programs that save lives in the workplace. If 
the same cost constraint is applied universally to all occupational 
hazards, economic factors become the primary concern, while other 
considerations become less important. But other factors should re-
main equally important: the nature of the risk, how many people are 
at risk, how voluntarily it is assumed, who bears the cost, who gets 
the benefits, whether there is something especially dreadful about 
the hazard, how much individual freedom has to be sacrificed in 
order to eliminate it, exactly what economic goods might become 
more expensive, and so on. Once all these other considerations are 
given their full due, it is likely that the implied cost per life saved for 
different programs will differ considerably. Enforcing a consistency 
along the cost dimension, then, is a way of discounting the impor-
tance of equally important factors. 
It may at first seem that, since the programs designed to save lives 
on the job accomplish their goal at a certain cost, any decision to pro-
ceed with such a program must be based upon cost considerations. 
There is, in other words, an implicit value of life-saving present in 
72. See text at notes 54 to 58 supra. 
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each decision to proceed. It may seem, then, that calling for the 
adoption of a unit cost containment figure simply makes explicit a 
previously hidden decision criterion and therefore opens it up to 
public debate. This position, however, confuses a consequence of a 
decision with a basis for it. A decision may imply the acceptance of a 
certain cost to save a life, but this figure may not have been a 
primary reason for making the decision. It may not even have 
formed any part of its justification. It may be that after an explicit 
decision has been made to save certain lives that a cost per life saved 
figure can be inferred. When a decision is based on a balance of other 
factors, the unit cost results from this weighing but does not deter-
mine it. Hence, it is not always correct to describe a cost of life figure 
as a hidden decision criterion.73 
A more general problem faces these cost containment approaches: 
both seem to address the problem of setting levels of occupational 
hazard control from the wrong direction. They set a cost constraint 
on some basis or other and allow this decision to determine indirectly 
the level of protection to be offered. But the problem is in setting the 
right level of protection, as opposed to simply controlling regulatory 
costs. Why not determine this level directly? Why not set the level of 
protection desired in some reasonable way and then let this deter-
mine unit and total costs? Strategies other than cost containment 
may, therefore, be more promising. 
B. Risk-Averse Strategies 
Risk-averse strategies do not set levels of effort in occupational 
safety and health programs by employing a fixed cost constraint. In-
stead, they approach occupational illnesses and injuries as undesir-
able events whose probability of occurrence should be minimized. 
One risk-averse rule calls for zero risk, where this is technologically 
feasible. This rule, of course, gives economic costs no weight and is 
equivalent to treating risk reduction as lexically prior to all other 
endeavors. A more balanced rule is obviously needed. It does not 
follow, however, that zero risk is never a reasonable goal. A ban on 
the use of asbestos, for example, would reduce the occupational risk 
of asbestos-related diseases to zero and may in fact be the best policy 
to deal with this particular hazard, if there are competitive nontoxic 
substitutes available. It may not be possible to reduce all risks to 
zero, but this provides no argument against zero risk as a goal in par-
ticular cases. 
73. See Kelman, supra note 6, at 40. 
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Other risk-averse strategies do not aim at reducing the risks of oc-
cupational injury or illness to zero. The maximin and minimax 
regret rules are borrowed from the literature of decision theory and 
sometimes applied to problems in occupational safety and health. 74 
The maximin rule directs attention to the most disastrous possible 
outcome of each regulatory alternative under consideration and re-
quires the decisionmaker to choose the alternative which has the 
most favorable worst possible consequence. The minimax regret rule 
is similar. It tells the decisionmaker to focus on the largest foregone 
benefit of each regulatory alternative and to choose the alternative 
having the smallest foregone benefit. The foregone benefit of a 
regulatory alternative would be determined by comparing the conse-
quences of adopting it with the consequences of adopting some other 
regulatory option. These rules are risk averse with respect to oc-
cupational injuries and illness because they do not discount the 
magnitude of these adverse outcomes by the probabilities of their oc-
currence. 
An example may clarify the use of these rules in the context of oc-
cupational safety and health. Suppose the problem is deciding how to 
regulate a substance that may be a mild, moderate, or strong car-
cinogen. The maximin rule would direct attention to the possibility of 
its being a mild carcinogen when considering an extremely stringent 
alternative, such as a ban, and would focus on the possibility of its be-
ing a strong carcinogen when considering the possibility of no 
regulatory action at all. The decision would then be made by compar-
ing these worst cases. The minimax regret rule would ask the ques-
tions: (1) what have we lost by regulating stringently if this substance 
turns out to be only a mild carcinogen?; and (2) what have we lost by 
regulating loosely if this substance turns out to be a strong car-
cinogen? The decision would then be made by comparing these two 
estimates of loss. 
These rules have a number of advantages. First, they do not ignore 
economic costs the way that a zero risk policy does, for, in comparing 
the worst cases or foregone benefits, some comparisons of economic 
costs to possible health gains must be made. Furthermore, these 
rules may be the best available when exact estimates of the prob-
74. These rules are discussed in detail in H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1968). For their 
application to cost-benefit analysis see ANDERSON, supra note 41, at 103-05. For their sug-
gested application to safety and health on the job see Cornell, Noll & Weingast, Safety Regula-
tion in SE'ITING NATIONAL PRIORITIES 469 (H. Owen & C. Schultze eds. 1976). Ashford, supra 
note 43, at 86, urges the use of the "minimize maximum regret" rule. For criticisms see M. 
BAILEY, REDUCING RISKS TO LIFE: MEASUREMENT OF THE BENEFITS 19-22 (1980). 
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abilities involved cannot be obtained at reasonable cost. Finally, in 
situations involving small probabilities of enormous harm, these 
rules can be useful because the harm may be so catastrophic that 
even a small probability of its occurrence must be avoided.75 Thus, 
these rules are most helpful where the consequences of not 
regulating quickly and effectively could be genuinely catastrophic 
and the costs of regulating are relatively modest. 
These rules, however, cannot be made the sole basis for decision 
making. They are not as attractive when the probabilities of harm 
are more exactly known because they focus attention on the worst 
cases even when the probabilities involved are vanishingly small. 
When catastrophic harm is not involved, this may be bad policy. The 
focus on the worst cases and the disregard for the size of the prob-
abilities involved could, step by step, over a long period of time, im-
pose deadweight economic losses that are themselves catastrophic. 
Furthermore, these rules presuppose some method of weighing 
economic costs against health benefits but do not provide help in 
choosing such a method. A different approach that would provide 
some guidance in weighing economic costs against health benefits is 
needed. 
c. Feasibility Analysis 
The policy of OSHA under Dr. Eula Bingham76 was to set stand-
ards regulating exposure to toxic substances based upon a criterion 
of feasibility. This feasibility approach avoids the fixed cost con-
straint of the cost containment approach, and provides a way of 
directly setting desirable levels of protection. Like the risk-averse 
strategies, it generally attempts to minimize threats to safety and 
health on the job, and yet it provides a bit more guidance in the area 
of weighing economic costs against health benefits. 
The policy, in the most general terms, calls for the lowest feasible 
level of toxic exposure in the workplace, which is consistent with a 
literal reading of section 6(b)(5) of the Act. 77 The approach of the 
75. For a detailed discussion of what to do about low probabilities of catastrophic harm see 
Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 EcoLOGY L.Q. 207 (1978). 
76. Dr. Bingham headed OSHA from 1977 to 1981. 
77. Section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 656(b)(5) (1976), 
states: "The Secretary, in promUlgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful 
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to 
the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer 
material impairment of health or functional capacity." For further discussion see Berger & 
Riskin, Economic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating Toxic Substances under the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 7 EcoLOGY L.Q. 285 (1978). 
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agency to regulation may be pictured, roughly and generally, as 
follows. The agency asks first whether a substance is hazardous, that 
is, whether any material impairment to health would follow from ex-
posure to it. If no, the agency does nothing. If yes, OSHA tries to 
determine the level of exposure at which no material impairment 
would take place. OSHA's generic policy for carcinogens sets this 
level at zero in the absence of proof to the contrary.78 If this zero-
level is not technologically feasible, the agency then selects the 
lowest exposure level that can be met with reasonably available 
technology. If the affected industries cannot afford to achieve this 
level, the agency then requires the lowest economically feasible ex-
posure standard. The criterion of economic feasibility might require 
some firms to close down, namely, those that could not remain prof-
itable and at the same time meet the standard. The industry as a 
whole, however, could not be crippled or destroyed. 
In principle, the constraint of feasibility is simply a matter of what 
can be done, and the goal of the regulation of toxic substances is to 
provide the maximum possible protection against material impair-
ment of health. Notice that this approach does not countenance an 
explicit balancing of costs and benefits in particular cases. This is 
not because the advantages of safety and health on the job do not 
have to be compared to economic costs and other losses. The reason 
no trade-offs are permitted in determining particular permissible ex-
posure levels is that the balance between occupational safety and 
health and other values has already been set by Congress when it in 
effect declared that lowest feasible level standards are worth 
whatever trade-offs are necessary in terms of economic costs and 
other values. Balancing worker health against other values, in short, 
must be done as part of overall national policy, but the agency cannot 
substitute its judgment of the proper balance in particular cases for 
the congressional directive to promulgate lowest feasible level stand-
ards. 
Despite its consideration of costs, feasibility analysis clearly allows 
the promulgation of extremely protective standards. Affected in-
dustries contend that some of the standards passed under the 
feasibility criterion are overly stringent.79 Inevitably, this criterion 
for setting occupational safety and health standards has received at-
tention in the federal courts. OSHA's use of feasibility analysis was 
78. OSHA's proposed generic cancer policy may be found at 42 Fed. Reg. 54,158 (1977). The 
final policy is at 45 Fed. Reg. 5,002 (1980). The policy is now under review. 
79. See, e.g., Fleming, The Spiraling Cost of Regulation: Seven Critical Reforms, 1 CHEM. 
TIMES & TRENDS 16, 16-21 (1978). 
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challenged when it set a standard lowering the exposure level for 
benzene from ten parts per million (ppm) to one ppm.80 The 
American Petroleum Institute (API) challenged the standard before 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and on 
preenforcement review won a judgment declaring the standard in-
valid on the grounds that it was based on conclusions that could not 
be supported by the administrative record.81 In particular, the lower 
court found that the agency had failed to show that the 1 ppm ex-
posure limit was reasonably necessary to provide for safety in the 
workplace. OSHA appealed to the Supreme Court, the case was 
argued October 10, 1979, and on July 2,1980 the Court affirmed the 
judgment of the lower court by a margin of five to four. 82 Two ques-
tions were presented for decision in this case. First, and most promi-
nent, was whether a standard regulating occupational exposure to 
toxic substances must satisfy a cost-benefit test. The second question 
concerned the quantity and quality of health effect information need-
ed to support such a standard. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the agency had exceeded its 
authority in lowering the benzene standard from ten ppm to one ppm 
because it had not determined that benzene posed a significant risk 
of material health impairment below the ten ppm level of exposure. 
But the ruling did not affect the use of feasibility analysis by the 
agency. In effect, the ruling imposed an additional constraint of 
determining the existence of a significant health risk at particular 
levels of exposure before a toxic substance could be regulated. This 
ruling shifted the burden of proof onto the agency to show that a par-
ticular substance posed a health hazard at the regulated levels of ex-
posure. OSHA could no longer justify setting a particular exposure 
level by noting that no safe level of exposure had yet been deter-
mined, and that, therefore, the lowest feasible level of exposure was 
required. The quantity and quality of health effect information 
OSHA was required to obtain before regulating was, therefore, 
greatly increased.83 
The benzene decision was silent on the question of setting ex-
posure levels by balancing costs and benefits. Hence, one option in 
the postbenzene climate of opinion was to retain the lowest feasible 
level of exposure policy, but supplement it with a significant risk 
80. The final standard is codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1981). 
81. 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978). 
82. Industrial Union Dep't, A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. Amer. Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980). 
83. For further general discussion of this case see D. Doniger, Defeat in Benzene Exposure 
Case: No Death Knell for OSHA Standards, The Nat'!. L.J., Sept. 15, 1980, at 26. See also A 
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threshold test. It was open to the agency to operate under a policy 
that exposure limits should be set at the lowest feasible levels which 
are reasonably necessary or appropriate to eliminate significant 
health risks. While this would supplement the feasibility criterion 
with a significant risk criterion, it would not require the balancing of 
costs and benefits in setting particular levels of exposure. It would 
allow the possibility of determining the significance of the health 
risks at one decision level and the affordability of the costs at 
another level. The principle that if it is worth regulating at all, it is 
worth regulating to the lowest feasible level would remain intact. 
OSHA took advantage of this option in its defense of the cotton 
dust standard.84 In 1978, the agency had promulgated a final rule 
limiting exposures to cotton dust in the cotton textile industry. 85 The 
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. (ATMI) sought to 
have the standard invalidated in preenforcement review before the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, but, in 
October 1979, the Court of Appeals upheld the standard.86 ATMI ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, oral arguments were held in January 
1981, and on June 17, 1981 the Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the lower court.87 
The question presented for review in this case was the cost-benefit 
question that had been left unresolved in the benzene decision. In 
particular, the question was whether OSHA was required to show 
that the improvements in the health of workers that could be ex-
pected to follow enforcement of the cotton dust standard were 
significant in light of the economic costs the standard would impose 
on industry. OSHA took the position that such cost-benefit com-
parisons were not required, and furthermore, that the Act prohibited 
the agency from engaging in individualized cost-benefit comparisons 
in particular rule-making cases. The individual cost-benefit judg-
ments were prohibited because they would interfere with the con-
Light Rein Falls on OSHA, 209 SCIENCE 547 (1980). 
84. See Brief for the Federal Respondent. Amer. Textile Manufacturers Inst. v. Donovan. 
101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981). The agency also took this option when, in response to the benzene deci-
sion, it withdrew some language from its cancer policy and proposed new language. The initial 
policy called for setting exposure limits for carcinogens at the lowest feasible level. The pro-
posed new requirement would set exposure limits at the lowest feasible level which is 
reasonably necessary or appropriate to eliminate significant risk. The "reasonably necessary 
or appropriate" phrase derives from the definition of a standard in § 3(8) of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 653(8) (1976). See 46 Fed. Reg. 7,402 (1981). 
85. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,350 (1978). 
86. 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
87. Amer. Textile Manufacturers Inst. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981). 
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gressional mandate to promulgate standards imposing the lowest 
feasible level of significant health risk. 88 
The Supreme Court upheld OSHA's position in this case, ruling 
that the agency was not required to employ cost-benefit analysis to 
set particular standards regulating exposure to toxic substances. 
Further, the Court declared that any such standard less protective 
than one based upon feasibility analysis was inconsistent with the 
Act.89 In effect, then, the Court barred the agency from using cost-
benefit criteria to set toxic substances standards, enjoining it instead 
to use feasibility analysis. 
Several issues remained unresolved by this decision. The use of 
cost-benefit analysis to determine which toxic substances could be 
regulated first was not addressed.90 In addition, the question of 
whether cost-benefit analysis could be applied to safety standards 
was not answered.91 Finally, the role of other economic approaches, 
such as cost-effectiveness analysis, was not made clear.92 
88. See Brief for the Federal Respondent at 38, Amer. Textile Manufacturers Inst. v. 
Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1978). 
89. The crucial question turned on the interpretation of § 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 656(b)(5) (1976). The Court held that 
Congress itself defined the basic relationship between costs and benefits, by placing 
the "benefit" of worker health above all other considerations save those making at-
tainment of this "benefit" unachievable. Any standard based on a balancing of costs 
and benefits by the Secretary that strikes a different balance than that struck by Con-
gress would be inconsistent with the command set forth in Section 6(b)(5). Thus, cost-
benefit analysis by OSHA is not required by the statute because feasibility analysis is. 
101 S. Ct. at 2490. 
90. The Court expressed no view on the question whether "other provisions of the Act . 
may authorize OSHA to explore costs and benefits for deciding between issuance of several 
standards regulating different varieties of health and safety hazards." 101 S. Ct. at 2490. 
OSHA had claimed authority to use cost-benefit analysis in deciding which of several health 
hazards to regulate first. See Brief for the Federal Respondent at 56, Amer. Textile Manufac-
turers Inst. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981). 
91. The Court gave conflicting signals on this question stating at one point that "Congress 
could reasonably have concluded that health standards should be subject to different criteria 
than safety standards," 101 S. Ct. at 2492 (1981), and at another that Congress "chose to 
place pre-eminent value on assuring employees a safe and healthful working environment, 
limited only by the feasibility of achieving such an environment." Id. at 2506 (emphasis added). 
92. Section 3(8) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 653(8) (1976), 
defines a standard as a measure that is "reasonably necessary or appropriate" to provide safe 
or healthful employment. In a crucial footnote, the Court raised the issue of the use of cost-
effectiveness analysis by stating that "if the use of one respirator would achieve the same 
reduction in health risk as the use of five, the use of five respirators was 'technologically and 
economically feasible,' and OSHA thus insisted on the use of five, then the 'reasonably 
necessary or appropriate' limitation might come into playas an additional restriction on OSHA 
to choose the one-respirator standard." 101 S. Ct. at 2493. There is some indication that 
OSHA will attempt to use cost-effectiveness analysis. See note 88 infra and accompanying 
text. 
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Despite these unresolved issues, the general model of decision 
making that emerges from the cotton dust case is virtually the same 
as the prebenzene model. 93 As before, the agency can be pictured as 
asking a series of questions. First, is there a significant risk of 
material impairment of worker health at current levels of exposure? 
If no, then do nothing. If yes, then determine the level at which this 
risk is not significant. OSHA no longer claims the authority to use a 
zero-risk policy at this point; instead it assesses each carcinogen or 
toxic substance separately, for even if there is no absolutely safe 
level above zero exposure, the remaining risk mayor may not be 
significant. The determination of significant risk can be made on 
health grounds, without balancing costs and benefits. Consideration 
of economic and technological matters takes place later in the proc-
ess and follows the same feasibility approach as before the benzene 
decision. As a result of the cotton dust decision, the present Assist-
ant Secretary at OSHA, Thorne G. Auchter, has revised an initial 
plan to use cost-benefit analysis in a review of the cotton dust and 
lead standards. 94 
Despite the victory in court, feasibility analysis has some limita-
tions as a model for decisionmaking in occupational safety and 
health. The threshold test of significant risk which was imposed upon 
OSHA by the benzene decision is far from clear. Among the ques-
tions that must be confronted are these: (1) Does "significance" ap-
93. The Court defined "feasibility analysis" by quoting the Brief for the Respondent Unions 
where OSHA's procedure is defined as asking a series of questions: 
First, whether the 'place of employment is unsafe - in the sense that significant risks 
are present and can be eliminated or lessened by a change in practices.' . . . Second, 
whether of the possible available correctives the Secretary had selected 'the standard 
... that is most protective.' ... Third, whether that standard is 'feasible.' 
101 S. Ct. at 2489. 
94. The Secretary of Labor, Raymond Donovan, filed a supplemental memorandum with the 
Supreme Court after the oral arguments had been heard in Jan., 1981. In this memorandum, 
he asked the Court to remand the cotton dust case so that the Secretary could explore the 
feasibility of using cost· benefit analysis in a review of the standard. Motion for Leave to File 
Supplemental Memorandum, and Supplemental Memorandum for the Federal Respondent, 
Amer. Textile Manufacturers Inst. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1978). The Court "declined to 
adopt" this suggestion, 101 S. Ct. at 2488. Before the Court's decision, however, Thorne G. 
Auchter announced a review of the lead and cotton dust standards using a three-step evalua-
tion procedure. The first step is the determination of the significance of the risk involved. The 
second step is assessment of cost and the third is cost-benefit balancing under Executive Order 
12,29l. See 10 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REP. (BNA) 1444 (Apr. 16, 1981). Since the 
cotton dust decision, Mr. Auchter has revised this evaluation procedure. The new procedure 
will include a demonstration of significant risk, a demonstration that the standard will actually 
protect workers, an assessment of the economic feasibility of the standard, and a finding of 
cost-effectiveness. See Shabecoff, Safety Agency to Forgo Cost-Benefit Analysis, N.Y. Times, 
July 13,1981, at A-ll, col. l. 
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ply to the magnitude of the risk per individual or the magnitude of 
the expected outcome, that is, the number of deaths or injuries?96 (2) 
Must a chemical or other hazard pose a significant risk in itself, or 
should the unit for regulation consist of a group of chemicals that act 
synergistically?96 (3) May policy questions be cleanly separated from 
factual questions in assessing significance of risk?97 (4) What should 
be done, if anything, about hazards that do not pass the threshold 
test of significant risk but can be eliminated or greatly reduced at lit-
tle or no cost?98 
The notion of feasibility, that provides the equivalent of a cost con-
straint in this approach, is also far from clear. How seriously must an 
industry be harmed before a standard is no longer economically 
feasible? Are there criteria for feasibility that impose an effective 
constraint on the agency? Beyond these questions of clarity, the idea 
that no trade-offs are allowed in particular cases raises questions of 
balance. For example, when several toxic substances are used in the 
same industry it may be economically feasible to control each 
substance individually, but not all at the same time. Surely some 
trade-offs would have to be made in instances like this.99 The lack of 
clarity in the concept of feasibility and the likely need to balance 
costs and benefits in particular rule-making cases may lead to a 
situation in which balancing judgments are in fact made, but are 
publicly justified in terms of feasibility. 
There is still, therefore, a pressing need for principles that will 
help to make these balancing judgments. This does not mean, 
95. In Justice Stevens' opinion in the benzene case, he argued that a risk of one in a billion is 
clearly not significant, while a risk of one in a thousand is. Industrial Union Dept. 
A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. Amer. Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2871 (majority opinion). This sug-
gests that OSHA should determine some probability of harm, say one in half a million, as a cut-
off and regulate only risks greater than that. 
96. For a discussion of the OSHA cancer policy see 45 Fed. Reg. 5,002 (1980). 
97. See Cornfield,Carcinogenic Risk Assessment, 198 SCIENCE 693 (1977). He correctly 
identifies some policy issues in the assessment of the magnitude of the risk of cancer at low 
levels of exposure. This makes it unlikely that a clean division can be made between a factual 
assessment of the size of a risk and a policy determination of its significance. In this regard, 
though, Richard DiSilva makes the useful distinction between policy decisions on how to assess 
the size of a risk when data or adequate theories are lacking and the essentially normative 
determination of the acceptability of risk. DiSilva, Cost-Benefit Analysis for Standards 
Regulating Toxic Substances Under the Occupational Safety & Health Act: American 
Petroleum v. OSHA, 60 B.U. L. REV. 115, 135 (1980). 
98. See The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 242 (1980). The idea that risks 
with no benefits and easily avoidable risks should be eliminated regardless of their size is a 
staple of the risk assessment literature. See, e.g., Comar, Risk: A Pragmatic De Minimis Ap-
proach, 203 SCIENCE 319 (1979). 
99. This objection to feasibility analysis is made by Page & Robbins, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
in RECENT ADVANCES IN OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (J.C. McDonald ed. 1981). 
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however, that formal cost-benefit analysis is the most desirable ap-
proach. The use of economic information is absolutely essential in the 
occupational safety and health area, and cost-benefit criteria can be 
useful in assessing the effect of standards on economic efficiency. 
But cost-benefit analysis does not provide a proper framework for 
balancing all the relevant values that have to be taken into considera-
tion in setting health and safety standards. It is crucial to recognize, 
then, that not all balancing need be based exclusively on cost-benefit 
comparisons. A distinction must be drawn between justifying a level 
of effort in an occupational safety and health program on the basis of 
a comparison of the monetary value of the associated costs and 
benefits, and justifying such a program by weighing the reasons for 
and against it and deciding that, all things considered, the level of ef-
fort in the program is worthwhile. The first method is simply the 
cost-benefit approach and in effect treats efficiency as the only, or 
the most important, consideration. The second method considers ef-
ficiency, and might sometimes give it pride of place, but also con-
siders individual rights, justice, and competing public values as 
reasons for or against a level of effort in a program.100 In the first 
case, the basis of decision is already given, and the crucial questions 
are technical. In the second case, most of the technical questions re-
main, although some are less urgent (for example, the monetary 
value of safety), but the bases for decision making are unclear. It is 
here that much further work needs to be done. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By calling attention to the fact that occupational safety and health 
is one of many desirable goals of public policy, proponents of cost-
benefit analysis have opened the door for integrating job safety into 
the framework of a coherent, overall industrial policy. However, the 
cost-benefit approach and the cost-containment strategies discussed 
earlier are inherently unable to incorporate all the considerations 
relevant to occupational safety and health. Risk-averse strategies 
and feasibility analysis are also incomplete. In formulating a new ap-
proach to occupational safety and health policy within an industrial 
policy framework, the conceptual and normative issues raised earlier 
cannot be ignored. Hazards in the workplace do not merely increase 
100. For a discussion of the importance of weighing competing values, as opposed to simply 
comparing costs and benefits, see Vaupel, The Benefits of Health and Safety Regulation, in THE 
BENEFITS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY RgGULATION (A. Ferguson and E.P. LeVeen eds. 1981); 
Singer, supra note 53. 
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the chances of injury for individuals-they also increase the overall 
toll of injury and illness for the nation. Moreover, workplace risks 
are fundamentally different from the voluntarily assumed risks of 
everyday life because they do not typically challenge the skills of 
those who must withstand them, they are rarely intrinsically en-
joyable or symbolically important, and they normally involve a con-
flict of interest between labor and management characterized by im-
balances of power, information, and mobility. Finally, the distribu-
tion of occupational risks among individuals and groups is arbitrarily 
unequal. 
These points suggest that safety on the job is a matter of communi-
ty interest, not individual discretion, and they lead to several nor-
mative guidelines for collective action. First, there is a need to 
preserve people's rights to protection against unreasonable health 
threats while they are earning their livelihood. Second, efforts 
should be made to achieve a more equitable distribution of the oc-
cupational risks that cannot be easily eliminated. Finally, social ac-
tion is required to realize widely shared public values, such as the 
conviction that conditions of work should reflect a concern and 
respect for workers' dignity and autonomy, that lie behind the group 
interest in workplace safety. Although these normative considera-
tions do not determine an overall level of effort, much less the details 
of particular regulatory actions, their neglect by decisionmakers will 
inevitably lead to an impoverished occupational safety and health 
policy. 
